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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Johnny and Lynn Urrutia were husband and wife, during their marriage they formed 
Sundance Arena LLC, along with Scott and Lori Jackson and deeded the subject horse arena 
property to the LLC. (R. Vol. I, p. 175; R. Vol. I, p. 225; R. Vol. III, p. 317.) Later the Jackson's 
withdrew from Sundance Arena LLC and still later Johnny and Lynn divorced. Their divorce 
decree was silent as to Sundance Arena LLC but did award the subject arena property to Johnny. 
The decree also provided that Johnny would pay Lynn certain sums of money which he 
apparently did not pay. (R. VoL I, pp. 31, 33 - 38,40; R. Vol. I, pp. 124, 126 - 130, 132; R. 
Aug., pp. 284,286,290, 292.) 
In 2005 Ty Harrison entered into an oral contract with Johnny Urrutia to fix, repair and 
improve the arena property ("Arena") so it could then be sold, at that time Johnny Urrutia was a 
licensed real estate agent. (R. Aug., p. 358.) Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte were longtime 
friends and as Robert Schutte lived adjacent to the arena Ty Harrison asked Robert to help with 
the work on the arena. (R. Aug., p. 162.) 
Schutte and Harrison spent considerable time and effort cleaning up, repairing, expanding 
and later running the subject arena. (R. Aug., pp. 154, 169, 181, 183.) 
Schutte and Harrison learned that Lynn Urrutia was going to file to foreclose on the arena 
property, so Schutte and Harrison filed a Claim of Lien to protect their labor and materials on 
December 1,2011. (R. Vol. I, p. 59.) 
On February 14, 2012, Lynn Urrutia files her Complaint. (R. VoL I, pp. 14 - 49; R. Vol. 
I, pp. 107-122.) 
On May 16,2012 Schutte and Harrison file a second or amended Claim of Lien. (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 74-78; R. Vol. I, pp. 86 - 90; R. Vol. I, pp. 164 -168; R. Aug., pp. 327, 331.) 
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On August 21, 2012 Plaintiff files for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to get Schutte 
and Harrison's first Claim of Lien dismissed. (R. Aug. Vol., pp. 4, 6.) 
October 15,2012, Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at which 
Plaintiff is successful in getting Schutte and Harrison's first Claim of Lien dismissed, completely 
ignoring the second or amended claim oflien. (Tr. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 3 -71.) 
09/23/02 
11/30104 
11121107 
12/04/07 
12/01111 
02114112 
02/29112 
05/16112 
08/21112 
Chronology 
Quitclaim Deed - Johnny & Lynn Urrutia and Scott & Lori Jackson deed the 
subject property to Sundance Arena LLC. 
Deed of Trust - between Sundance Arena LLC and Gary & Donna Hibbard 
regarding the subject property 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered between Johnny and Lynn Urrutia. 
Deed of Trust - between Johnny Urrutia personally, no mention of Sundance 
Arena LLC, and Lynn Urrutia purportedly on the subject arena property. 
Claim of Lien - Harrison and Schutte on the arena property for the time period 
April 2005 through October 2011. 
Complaint - Lynn Urrutia files against Johnny Urrutia, Rob Schutte and Ty 
Harrison. 
Listing Resume from Land Title and Escrow, Inc -listing only the Quitclaim 
Deed #2002-019528 filed 09/23/02 in which the Urrutias and Jacksons deed the 
arena property to Sundance Arena LLC; and the Deed of Trust #2004-025612 
between Sundance Arena LLC and the Hibbards filed 11130104. 
Notice of Claim of Labor and Materialmen's Lien - Harrison and Schutte's 
second or amended lien on the arena property for the time period March 2008 and 
"ongoing". 
Plaintiff files Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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0911212012 Plaintiff files for Preliminary Injunction 
09/19/2012 Notice of Trustee's Sale of Sundance Arena LLC by Hibbard 
10115112 Hearing - Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Plaintiff is 
successful in getting Defendants Harrison and Schutte's Claim of Lien filed 
12/01111 dismissed, completely ignoring the secondlamended Notice of Claim of 
Labor or Materialmen's Lien filed 05116112. 
02/07/2013 Trustee's Sale of Sundance Arena LLC 
02/15/2013 Preliminary Injunction Quashed 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether Lynn Urrutia had 
standing to bring a claim to foreclose the deed of trust. 
2. Whether the district court erred in determining that Lynn Urrutia was the prevailing 
party. 
3. Whether the district court erred determining that the gravamen of the claim was a 
commercial transaction and awarding Lynn Urrutia attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-120. 
4. \\1hether the district court erred in determining that Defendants defended and pursued 
their claim frivolously, unreasonably and vvithout foundation, awarding Lynn Urrutia 
attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff's claim that Ms. Urrutia had standing to bring her claim fails because 
she did not have a redressable injury related to the claim. 
Plaintiff argues, relying on Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 375, 973 P.2d 
142, 146 (1999), that the issue of standing is about whether the party has a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy. (Resp. Brief, p. 13.) Here, Plaintiff contends, a party named as a 
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beneficiary in a Deed of Trust has a personal stake "in determining whether that lien is valid and 
enforceable." (Resp. Brief, p. 14.) 
Plaintiff s argument fails because Ms. Urrutia brought the wrong claim and her injury 
cannot be redressed. "To satisfY the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must 
'allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P .3d 
1157, 1159 (2001). Because Mr. and Ms. Urrutia did not have title to the property when they 
encumbered it with the deed of trust, Ms. Urrutia cannot foreclose and thus, her injury, 
nonpayment of the divorce settlement, cannot be redressed by this foreclosure action. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 31, 33 - 38, 40.) Instead, Ms. Urrutia should have brought an action to enforce the divorce 
decree in magistrate court with the proper parties involved. 
II. PlaintifPs claim that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party fails because here 
there are multiple claims and Ms. Urrutia gained no benefit from the litigation. 
Plaintiff argues that the lower court properly found that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing 
party because she obtained partial summary judgment to invalidate the mechanics' lien and 
succeeded in having the Defendants' counterclaims dismissed with prejudice. (Resp. Brief, p. 
16.) However, Plaintiffs arguments fail because Ms. Urrutia did not succeed in her claim to 
foreclose the deed of trust or gain any benefit from the litigation. 
The trial court in reference to the prevailing party argument stated: "But she's ended up 
with no relief in this case as to this particular part of the property because she got foreclosed." 
(Tr. Feb. 26,2013, Barksdale, p. 72,11. 2-4.) 
Plaintiff first contends that because the mechanics' lien and counterclaims were 
dismissed, Ms. Urrutia is the prevailing party, relying on Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball 
Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (et. App. 2000). However, not only is Daisy 
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Manufacturing distinguishable, it supports a fmding that Ms. Urrutia is not the prevailing party 
and therefore Plaintiff's argument fails. There, the court found three factors under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(B) that must be considering when determining which party prevailed: 
"(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were 
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties 
prevailed on each of the claims or issues." Id. at 262,999 P.2d at 917. In that case, the result 
obtained was a dismissal with prejudice and the court found that it was "the most favorable 
outcome that could possibly be achieved as a consequence of the litigation." Jd. 
Here, the Plaintiff, Ms. Urrutia, brought a claim to foreclose a deed of trust. The relief 
sought was payment of the promissory note secured by the deed of trust. (R. Vol. I, pp. 14 - 49.) 
Ms. Urrutia obtained neither because her entire claim was dismissed. (R. Vol. I, pp. 189 - 191.) 
However, because her foreclosure claim was dismissed and Defendants successfully retrieved 
their property, she did not gain any benefit from the litigation with the Defendants. Furthermore, 
Daisy is distinguishable because it was a single claim case, whereas here there were multiple 
claims between the parties. Therefore, Ms. Urrutia cannot be the prevailing party. Because the 
lower court did not consider this, it acted outside the bounds of its discretion. 
Plaintiff also relies on Sanders v. Lanliford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). 
This case is distinguishable because it also involved a single claim case. There, the court found 
that dismissal of a claim in a single claim case, even without a trial, constitutes prevailing in the 
action.ld. at 326, 1 P.3d at 827. Because it was a single claim case, the lower court's finding that 
dismissal did not constitute prevailing was outside the bounds of its discretion because it was 
inconsistent with applicable legal standards. Jd. Here, there were multiple claims between the 
parties and it must be evaluated in terms of the whole action, including the dismissal ofMr. 
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Urrutia's claim. (R. Vol. I, pp. 14 - 49; R. Vol. I, pp. 50 - 61, 107 -122.) The prevailing party is 
not automatic, as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff next argues that the lower court did not consider improper factors in determining 
the prevailing party. Rather, the court's statements were dicta and that "such contextual musing 
clearly were not the basis of the lower court's decision." (Resp. Brief, p. 17.) Plaintiff's 
argument fails because dicta is a discussion that is not the basis of the court's decision. Here, the 
court stated, 
But for Hibbard's foreclosure, she would have obtained ajudgment foreclosing 
defendant's first lien claim in its entirety. She completely prevailed on her defense of the 
counterclaim as defendants obtained no relief against her. Had this case progressed to 
trial, she would have clearly prevailed on defendants' second lien claim because it is 
undisputed that the priority of her deed of trust predated the second lien. Applying these 
principles oflaw, the Court determines that Lynn is the 'primary' prevailing party in this 
case within the meaning ofI.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
(R. Aug., p. 835.) Because the lower court listed the prospect of prevailing at trial and but for the 
Hibbard's foreclosure as part of the basis for fmding that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party, 
this was not merely dicta. The court acted inconsistently with applicable legal principles and 
therefore outside the bounds of its discretion. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that ifthe court finds that Defendants are the prevailing party, the 
court would be sanctioning the tort of abuse of process because they claimed personal property 
in the Mechanic's Lien. (Resp. Brief, p. 18.). They argue that "[t]o attempt to obtain possession 
of personal property by means of claim to foreclose a mechanics lien process; i.e. is a 
commission of the tort 'abuse of process.'" (Resp. Brief, p. 18.) Plaintiff's arguments, however, 
fail because moveable, portable chattel can qualifY as furnished materials under Idaho Code 
section 45-501. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 896, 174 P.3d 399, 405 (2007). The 
Defendants, in filing a claim of lien were trying to ensure payment for the work, improvements, 
and materials they furnished. If they could not receive payment, they were entitled to regain 
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possession of the materials furnished and non-fixtures, which they were successful at when Ms. 
Urrutia's claim was dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiff's abuse of process argument fails. 
III. Plaintiff's claim that the gravamen of the claim was a commercial transaction 
entitling Ms. Urrutia to attorney fees fails because there was no commercial 
transaction between Defendants and Ms. Urrutia. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants plainly alleged a commercial transaction underlying the 
mechanics' lien and the unjust emichment counterclaim. Relying on Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho 
462,469,259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011), Plaintiff argues that a commercial transaction does not need 
to actually be proven if the claims allege an underlying commercial transaction. (Resp. Brief, pp. 
20 - 21.) 
Plaintiff's argument fails because Garner v. Pavey is distinguishable from this case. In 
Garner, the claim involved the use of an easement over commercial property. Because of the 
commercial easement claim, the parties had a contractual agreement between them. The claim 
itself alleged a contract between the two parties, the Garners and the Poveys. Id. Here, the case 
does not allege a contractual agreement between Defendants and Ms. Urrutia. Although the 
mechanics' lien is a commercial agreement, it did not involve a transaction with Ms. Urrutia. 
Thus, this case is more similar to BECD Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 
719, 726, 184 P.3d 844,851 (2008). BECD held that where there was no transaction between the 
two parties, there was no commercial transactions which would entitle a party to attorney fees 
under the statute. Because there was no transaction between Ms. Urrutia and Harrison and 
Schutte and the claim does not allege a commercial transaction between them, there is no basis 
for fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). 
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Plaintiff's argument also fails because unjust enrichment is not a contractual claim by 
definition. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). 
Unjust enrichment is a theory used when there was no contract between the parties. Id. Here, 
Defendants claimed unjust enrichment as an alternative to recovering on the mechanics' lien 
because they made improvements for Johnny Urrutia, but in the foreclosure Ms. Urrutia was to 
receive the benefit of those uncompensated improvements. Therefore, because there was no 
contract or transaction between them, Defendants claimed unjust enrichment. 
Finally, Plaintiff's argument fails because the center of the lawsuit was Ms. Urrutia 
foreclosing a deed of trust granted to her as settlement for her divorce from Johnny Urrutia. 
Thus, she was seeking to enforce a divorce decree. (R. VoL I, p. 31.) A divorce decree is not a 
commercial transaction under the definition in the statute; rather it is a civil contract between 
spouses. 
IV. Plaintiff's contention that Defendants brought and pursued their claim 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation under Idaho Code 12-121 
fails because Defendants' claims had a basis in law. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' conduct was frivolous in pursuing the 2011 mechanic's 
lien because Harrison and Schutte admitted they only made minor improvements during the 90 
days prior to filing. (Resp. Brief, p. 22.) Plaintiff's argument fails because the Defendants 
claimed in their definition that the work was continuous and had not been substantially 
completed, providing a factual basis to pursue the claim of lien. (R. Aug., p. 197, 11. 7 10, p. 
211,11. 11 25, p. 212,11. 1 5; R. Aug., pp. 143 - 145.) A mechanic's claim oflien must be 
filed within 90 days after completion oflabar or services, or furnishing material. I.e. § 45-507. 
This means that the claim of lien must be filed within 90 days of the date the work contracted for 
is substantially completed. Because they had not substantially completed the work and the 
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Defendants continued to assert that they were making improvements, pursuing the claim of lien 
was not frivolous. 
Plaintiff next argues that the district court correctly determined that pursuing the amount 
of the mechanic's lien was frivolous because Defendants argued that the amount could be 
adjusted at trial and that defending the lien was not warranted by law. (Resp. Brief, p. 23). This 
argument fails because claiming an incorrect amount does not invalidate a lien. Electrical 
Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho at 825, 41 P.3d at 253. The district court has 
the discretion to award a lesser amount, even if the discrepancy is substantial. Id. Thus, because 
Defendants' pursuit ofthe mechanic's lien had a basis in law that the amount could be adjusted 
at trial, they did not pursue the claim frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Plaintiff further contends that there is no evidence that the second mechanic's lien 
covered the same work and that because the date is clearly after the Trust Deed priority date, thus 
pursuing the lien was frivolous. (Resp. Brief, p. 25.) This argument fails because a claimant can 
file a subsequent lien claiming work in a previous invalid lien. Terra- West, Inc. v. Idaho .Uutual 
Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 400, 247 P.3d 620,627 (2010). "A mechanic's lien, 'if any exists at 
all, relates back to the date of commencement of the work or improvement or the commencement 
to furnish the material.'" Id (quoting White v. Constitution Mining & Mill Co., 56 Idaho 403, 
420,55 P.2d 152, 160 (1936». There, the work was completed under a continuous employment 
contract, thus the lien "attached at the time the work began and encompassed all work 
subsequently done under the contract." Id As long as the lien substantially complies with the 
statute and is timely filed, the lien may encompass all labor or services performed under one 
contract. Id. Here, the both claims of lien specify the same property, Sundance Arena, and claim 
continuous work, and a similar value to the improvement. (R. Vol. I, pp. 59 61, 74 -78.) The 
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legislature saw fit to protect unsophisticated workmen by allowing them to only have to 
substantially comply as Harrison and Schutte did in this case. Thus, both liens claimed the same 
work and the second lien, although the date is different, relates back to the date of 
commencement of the work. Defendants' pursuit of the second mechanics' lien had a basis in 
law and was therefore not frivolous. 
Plaintiff next argues that the unjust enrichment claim was frivolous because the 
improvements conferred would not affect the amount of Ms. Urrutia's lien. (Resp. Brief, p. 25.) 
"Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be inequitable to 
retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." Vanderford Co., 
Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261,271 (2007), the Defendants asserted the 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment as an alternative argument in the event that Lynn Urrutia was 
successful in foreclosing the deed of trust and the mechanic's lien was unsuccessful.(R. VoL I, 
pp.60 78.) Ms. Urrutia would have received the benefit of the greatly improved property 
without compensating the defendants. She claimed an interest in the property through the deed of 
trust. A deed of trust that did not mention Sundance Arena LLC, the true owner, and which was 
not mentioned in the listing resume or in the foreclosure action by the Hibbards (R. Vol. 1, pp. 
00209-00223.) Therefore, Defendants were not frivolous in pursuing the counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' contradictory position is frivolous. (Resp. Brief, pp. 26 
- 27.) This argument fails because the Defendants were arguing in the alternative. If the 
mechanic's lien was unsuccessful, Defendants wanted to be free to remove the property and 
additional materials furnished that had not been paid for. (R. Vol. III, pp. 28 - 30, 104 - 106.) 
Additionally, Plaintiff argued contradictory positions. Plaintiff claimed that there were not any 
improvements made to the property, but also filed for an preliminary injunction, with a $1.00 
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bond, to prevent Defendants from removing their materials or deconstructing any improvements 
(R. Vol. III, pp. 11-27.) 
"If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees 
may not be awarded under this statute even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal 
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 
635,639, 132 P.3d 392,396 (2006). Defendants pursued their claims with a basis in law and in 
fact, thus Ms. Urrutia is not entitled to fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
V. Plaintiff's argument that the award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-123 was 
proper fails because Defendants argued in good faith and had a basis in law. 
Plaintiff argues that because the judge determined that the conduct of Defendants was 
frivolous, the award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-123 was proper if the lower 
court's conclusions are upheld. (Resp. Brief, p. 27.) Plaintiffs argument fails because the 
Defendants' arguments had a basis in law and argued for a good faith extension of the law. 
Defendants pursued the mechanics lien because the testimony in the depositions claim 
that the work and improvements were ongoing. (R. Aug., p. 197, 11. 7 10, p. 211, 11. 11 - 25, p. 
212,11. 1 5; R. Aug., pp. 143 - 145.) The mechanic's lien was supported with facts that 
substantially complied with the requirements of the statute. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. 
Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846,850,87 P. 3d 955, 959 (2003). Thus, the claim was suppOlied by fact as 
required by Idaho Code section 12-123. 
Second, Defendants' were not frivolous in opposing plaintiff's injunction and claiming 
personal property also claimed in the mechanic's lien. Materials furnished can be properly 
claimed in a mechanics' lien, Idaho Code section 45-501, and personal property can be the 
subject of a mechanics' lien. BA1C West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 896, 174 P.3d 399, 
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405 (2007). The Defendants sought to remove their surplus personal property and also those 
items in use in the arena but not attached so as to have become a fixture. This is clearly set out in 
the Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Bond Amount for Preliminary Injunction and the 
photographs attached thereto (R. Vol. III, pp. 535-573.) The Defendants should have been 
allowed to remove the items stacked and those that could have been lifted out of use without 
disturbing the ground or requiring any cutting or removal of bolts. The over broad preliminary 
injunction gave the Defendants good reason to include unjust enrichment as an alternative cause 
of action. The Defendants were in peril of losing not just the work and materials they put into the 
arena but also their surplus materials. "Forfeitures are abhorrent to the law, and all intendments 
are against them. Heisel v. Cunningham, 94 Idaho 461, 491 P.2d 178 (1971). [***14] Where the 
forfeiture provision in a contract would provide an unjust and unconscionable recovery, it will 
not be enforced and the recovery will be assessed according to the amount of actual damage. 
Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971), appeal after remand, 95 Idaho 769, 519 
P.2d 438 (1973)." Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 951 (Idaho 1991). 
Finally, Defendants' counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment has a basis in law and in 
fact and was not frivolous. Ms. Urrutia, if successful in her foreclosure claim would have 
received a greatly improved property without compensating Defendants. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,557, 165 P.3d 261,271 (2007). 
VI. Plaintifrs argument that the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions were 
proper because the judge properly found that Defendants were frivolous fails 
because Plaintiff and the lower court are considering the wrong standard. 
Plaintiff argues that the standard for Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions mirrors 
the definition of frivolous conduct under Idaho Code section 12-121 and Rule 54(e) and 
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therefore Mr. Rockstahl' s conduct in signing documents and bringing Defendants' claims is 
frivolous. (Resp. Brief, p. 28). 
Plaintiff's argument fails because they cite no authority for the assertion that the standard 
for Rule 11 sanctions is the same as the standard for Idaho Code section 12-121 and, in fact, they 
are not the same standard. 
Although the rules use similar language, they are distinguishable. Rule 11 states, 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has 
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose ... 
In contrast, Rule 54( e)(1) provides the standard for an award of fees under Idaho Code section 
12-121. It provides that fees may be awarded only when the court finds "that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." LR.C.P. 
54( e)(1). Both require that there be a basis for the claims, but Rule 11 "stresses the need for some 
prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the 
rule." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 95, 803 P.2d 993, 
1001. Further, "[t]he court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the 
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or 
other paper was submitted." Id. Thus, the standard is not the same because 12-121 does not focus 
on a reasonable inquiry. 
Because the district court did not apply the correct standard and consider whether 
Defendants made a proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry, the district court abused its 
discretion. It failed to act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. 
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VII. Attorney fees 
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because under Idaho Code section 12-121, 
the prevailing party is only entitled to recover attorney fees if the appeal was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 574,261 P.3d 
829,851 (2011). Further, "[w]here a case involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should 
not be granted under I.e. § 12-121." ld. Here, Defendants did not bring this appeal frivolously, 
unreasonably or \vithout foundation and argued novel legal questions, therefore, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Schutte and Harrison claim attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-121. These attorney's fees and costs are proper in this case for the reasons stated in 
this brief. See I.A.R. 35(b)(5), 40 and 41 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the judgment awarding 
attorney fees and costs to Lynn Urrutia. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this:l;1 day of November, 2013. 
ROCKST AHL LA W OFFICE, Chtd. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
y...~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on O$d day of November, 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the following-described document upon the person(s) listed below in the manner noted: 
Attorney for Lynn Urrutia 
Harry DeHaan 
Daniel Plantz 
Law Office of Harry DeHaan 
335 Blue Lakes Blvd. North 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
MFirst Class Mail 
I J Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
Joe Rockstahl 
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